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Recently, researchers have investigated the causal nature of attentional bias for threat (AB)
in the maintenance of anxiety disorders by experimentally manipulating it. They found
that training anxious individuals to attend to non-threat stimuli reduces AB, which, in
turn, reduces anxiety. This effect supports the hypothesis that AB can causally impact
the maintenance of anxiety. At a fundamental level, however, uncertainty still abounds
regarding the nature of the processes that mediate this effect. In the present paper, we
propose that two contrasting approaches may be derived from theoretical accounts of AB.
According to a first class of models, called the “valence-specific bias” models, modifying
AB requires the modification of valence-specific attentional selectivity. According to a
second class of models, called the “attention control models,” modifying AB requires the
modification of attention control, driven by the recruitment of the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex. We formulate a series of specific predictions, to provide suggestions to trial these
two approaches one against the other. This knowledge is critical for understanding the
mechanisms of AB in anxiety disorders, which bares important clinical implications.
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INTRODUCTION
The ability to rapidly orient attention toward threat in the
environment is crucial for survival. A wealth of research has
demonstrated that this phenomenon is exacerbated in anx-
iety disorders (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), where anxious indi-
viduals demonstrate faster engagement with and/or impaired
disengagement from threatening stimuli (Cisler and Koster,
2010). Recently, researchers have investigated the causal nature
of these biases in the maintenance of anxiety disorders, by
directly manipulating attentional biases (AB) for threat. They
found that training anxious individuals to attend to non-threat
cues (see Figure 1) reduces AB which, in turn, reduces anx-
iety (Hakamata et al., 2010; Beard et al., 2012). This effect
supports the hypothesis that AB can causally influence the main-
tenance of anxiety. At a fundamental level, however, uncer-
tainty abounds regarding the nature of this process. Clarifying
the mechanisms involved is important as attention bias mod-
ification (ABM) has only limited effectiveness in changing the
processing of threat (Beard et al., 2012), which is crucial for
studies using ABM for causal predictions as well as therapeutic
applications.
The main goal of the present paper is to relate ABM to the
neurocognitive mechanisms proposed by theoretical accounts of
AB1. We provide a brief review of theoretical and empirical
1During the last decade, there has been increasing interest in the establishment
of whether AB in anxiety results from preferential attention engagement with
emotionally threatening stimuli, or from a selective difficulty in disengaging
insights on these mechanisms. Then, we formulate suggestions
about how future research may reduce uncertainty regarding
these mechanisms.
THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF AB: STATE OF THE ART
Different models have been advanced to account for the mecha-
nism underlying the role of AB in the maintenance of anxiety. We
discuss here the main proposals by these models, which we have
organized into two broad approaches.
VALENCE-SPECIFIC MODELS
According to a first approach, AB is the result of valence-specific
cognitive operations at the level of appraisal and attention.
attention from such information. Researchers have developed a number of
attention assessment tasks in an attempt to measure these processes. Although
a growing body of research provided support for the hypothesis that anxious
individuals have difficulty in disengaging attention from threat (for a review,
see Cisler and Koster, 2010), it has been recently argued that many of the
tasks used to assess theses mechanisms may not be able of indexing the atten-
tional processes they claim to measure (for a review, see Clarke et al., 2013).
Moreover, most of the theoretical accounts of AB did not make specific pre-
dictions about the role of attentional engagement and disengagement in the
maintenance of AB. As themain focus of the present paper pertains to the neu-
rocognitive mechanisms behind ABM that are based on theoretical accounts
of AB, we used AB as a generic term for both attention engagement with emo-
tionally threatening stimuli and from selective difficulty disengaging attention
from such information (for recent studies discussing the potential role of
attentional engagement and/or disengagement during ABM, see Heeren et al.,
2011, 2012; Hirsch et al., 2011).
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FIGURE 1 | Sequence of the attention bias modification procedure.
Note: In the original version of the dot-probe paradigm, participants viewed
two stimuli (i.e., a threatening and a neutral) presented in two areas of a
computer screen for approximately 500ms. Immediately after the pictures
disappeared, a probe replaced one of the stimuli. Participants responded to
the probe as quickly as possible. In attention training, researchers typically
modify the original task such so that the probe nearly always (i.e., 95% of the
trials) replaces the neutral stimulus, thereby redirecting subjects’ attention to
non-threat cues. In the control condition, there was no contingency between
cues and probes.
Different models propose such a rationale (e.g., Beck and Clark,
1997; Mathews and Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg and Bradley, 2002).
For instance, according to the cognitive-motivational model of
anxiety (Mogg and Bradley, 1998, 2002), allocation of atten-
tion is a function of a valence evaluation system (VES), which
is in charge of an initial appraisal of the stimulus threat value.
Similarly, according to Mathews and Mackintosh’s model (1998),
AB is the result of a threat evaluation system that strengthens
the activation of threat-related attributes. Finally, according to
Beck and Clark (1997), AB results from an initial threat appraisal,
which favors the processing of threat-related material, and in turn
leads to the activation of cognitive, physiological, and behavioral
anxious responses.
Considered together, these models share the feature that anx-
ious individuals are characterized by a heightened threat evalu-
ation, even when the true threat value of the stimulus is mild
or ambiguous. This appraisal is the driving factor behind sub-
sequent AB. Research has found indirect support for the main
claim of these models, showing that high anxious individuals
are indeed more likely to allocate attention to mildly threaten-
ing information (Wilson and MacLeod, 2003). However, data
on initial threat appraisal, potentially providing direct support
for this claim, is inconsistent. For instance, it has been reported
that socially anxious individuals do not show biased evaluation
of threatening facial expressions (e.g., Melfsen and Florin, 2002;
Schofield et al., 2007) or of emotional facial expressions in gen-
eral (Philippot and Douilliez, 2005). However, recent findings did
show that socially anxious participants process early configural
information2 differently than did the non-anxious participants
(Langner et al., 2009).
The idea of a valence-specific bias also fits with some
of the neural data showing enhanced amygdala activity [and
functionally-related structures, for a review see Hofmann et al.
(2012)] involved in AB (Davis andWhalen, 2001). More centrally,
a wealth of data has demonstrated that the amygdala is involved in
early threat detection mechanisms (Öhman, 2005) and that anx-
ious individuals have increased amygdala activation in response
to threat (Stein et al., 2002; Phan et al., 2006). Alongside research
focusing explicitly on AB, event-related brain potentials (ERP)
studies, in which early components (e.g., P1) are usually linked to
2Although socially anxious individuals performed as well as non-anxious
individuals on a task assessing the ability to discriminate angry faces from neu-
tral faces, they did not utilize the same facial expression for the task. The fine
details (high spatial frequencies) around the eyes were discriminative for both
groups, but only socially anxious participants additionally processed rough
configural information (low spatial frequencies information from eyes, nose,
and mouth regions).
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configural mechanisms, while later components (e.g., P2, P3) are
linked to more strategic and executive mechanisms, also revealed
early signatures of visual processing of threat, i.e., change in early
posterior negativity, N170, and in P1 (Vuillemier and Pourtois,
2007; Rossignol et al., 2012).
ATTENTIONAL CONTROL MODELS
According to a second approach, AB may be considered as the
result of impaired attention control (AC), i.e., the ability to
voluntarily regulate the allocation of attentional resources. This
notion is based on findings that AC modulates AB. For instance,
Derryberry and Reed (2002) have found that high-trait anxious
individuals reporting poor AC exhibited stronger AB in a spa-
tial cueing task. In contrast, those who reported good AC did not
exhibit such effect. Similar findings were found using rapid serial
visual presentation task (Peers and Lawrence, 2009).
Different neurocognitive models have provided an explana-
tion for these findings (Bishop, 2007; Eysenck and Derakshan,
2011). First, according to Attention Control Theory (Eysenck
and Derakshan, 2011), impairments in the efficiency of the cen-
tral executive, particularly the inhibitory function of the central
executive (Eysenck et al., 2007) may maintain AB and anxiety.
Evidence for this position comes from studies showing that clin-
ically anxious individuals exhibit worse performance in tasks
requiring such control (e.g., antisaccade task), even in the absence
of threatening material (Derakshan et al., 2009; Wieser et al.,
2009). For instance, Wieser et al. (2009) reported that socially
anxious individuals exhibit difficulties in inhibiting the reflexive
orienting to neutral as well as to emotional stimuli.
Second, according to Bishop’s model (Bishop et al., 2004;
Bishop, 2008, 2009), AB can be seen as a failure to recruit AC,
and this failure is associated with decreased activation of the
prefrontal cortex, particularly of its dorsolateral part (DLPFC) in
order to down-regulate amygdala activation during the presen-
tation of threat (with increased amygdala activity as a proxy of
output from the VES). Accordingly, brain imaging studies show
that anxious individuals demonstrate reduced activation of the
DLPFC during such an inhibitory task (Bishop, 2009). However,
as these studies did not include any connectivity analysis,
conclusions can only be drawn based on prefrontal activation
patterns. Future studies should further explore whether the
DLPFC—amygdala connectivity is associated with the failure to
recruit AC.
RELATING ABM TO THE THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF AB
Remarkably, there is extensive theorizing on the mechanisms
associated with AB but ABM research is rarely related to these the-
ories. In relation to key models of anxiety and attention depicted
above, two core hypotheses can be generated to account for the
effect of ABM on anxiety.
According to the first class of models, the valence-specific mod-
els (VSM) the maintenance of AB is the result of the activation of
a biased VES. These models propose that, regardless of attentional
resources, individuals would allocate attention to stimuli that are
initially appraised as threatening. According to such models, if
the VES remains unchanged individuals should initially orient to
threat.
According to the alternative models, hereafter called atten-
tion control models (ACM), AB involves impaired recruitment
of AC. These latter models propose that anxious individuals are
characterized by an impaired recruitment of AC in cognitively
demanding tasks, which is most pronounced in the presence of
external threat or anxious thoughts. In relation to such models,
the reduction of AB involves an improvement in the AC system
without necessarily changing the valence-specific bias.
THEORETICAL FORMULATIONS AND PREDICTIONS
We argue that these two types of processes can be contrasted to
consider the mechanisms underlying the therapeutic benefits of
ABM. According to VSM, modifying AB should not influence
early AB as this is under control of the VES. According to ACM,
modifying AB requires the modification of AC. Although both
approaches share the view that AB is a factor causally involved
in the maintenance of anxiety, the nature of the process leading
to this involvement is still unclear. A future challenge would be
to specify how these two types of processes are involved in the
maintenance of AB. At a basic level, they differ on at least two
dimensions (see Figure 2). One dimension is the requirement of
AC. VSM holds that the implication of AC does not determine the
reduction of AB, whereas ACM predicts that reducing AB requires
such a reduction. However, to our knowledge, no previous study
has directly assessed the impact of directly manipulating AC on
the effect of AB.
Another critical dimension is the function of the VES. VSM
hold a strong causal antecedent position concerning the VES,
suggesting that the reduction of AB necessarily involves a mod-
ification of the valence-specific bias without necessarily involving
an improvement in AC. In contrast, the ACM suggests that ABM
involves an improvement in general AC without involving a
modification of the VES.
Finally, even if the two theoretical accounts discussed above
are presented as opposing each other, it is important to men-
tion that the mechanisms suggested by VSM and ACM interact
during ABM. Research has found that “emotional” areas may
inform “cognitive” areas about the value of directing attention to
a given stimulus (e.g., Pessoa and Engelmann, 2010). Conversely,
AC may change the responsivity of “emotional” areas, such as
the amygdala (Pessoa, 2008, 2010). Moreover, the activation of
the amygdala toward threat depends on the availability of the
attention resources (Pessoa, 2005), highlighting again the fuzzy
boundaries between the VES and AC.
As a consequence, a first central issue is the exploration of
the involvement of AC in ABM. According to the ACM, reduc-
ing AB should require such a control process whereas this is not
necessary according to VSM. Previous researchers have hypoth-
esized that ABM bolsters AC in ways that may foster the ability
to down regulate anxiety (Klumpp and Amir, 2010). Moreover,
it has also been reported that change in AB via ABM depends
on the initial level of AC (Paulewicz et al., 2012). Further, sup-
porting the hypothesis that frontal regions (as a proxy of AC)
are involved in ABM, it has been shown that inducing AB for
threat is related to altered activation of the DLPFC to emotional
stimuli rather than to change in subcortical regions (Browning
et al., 2010). Despite this preliminary suggestion, the general
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FIGURE 2 | A schematic summary of the different models depicted in
the present article. Note: (A) A first position proposes a strong causal
antecedent role for the VES, claiming that the reduction of AB
necessarily involves a modification of the valence-specific bias without
involving an improvement in AC. (B) In contrast, a second position
suggests that ABM involves an improvement in AC without any
modification of the VES. (C) A third position suggests that both VES
and AC are causally involved in the reduction of AB. (D) It has been
suggested that the DLPFC may be considered as a proxy of AC,
whereas the amygdala as a proxy of the VES. Abbreviations: AB,
Attentional Bias; AC, Attention Control; DLPFC, Dorsolateral Prefrontal
Cortex; VES, Valence Evaluation System.
AC hypothesis needs to be tested by directly manipulating the
involvement of such a control mechanism during ABM. To test
this hypothesis, future studies may cross an ABM procedure with
a manipulation of the cognitive load using a dual-task impairing
the central executive resources (e.g., memorizing 1 number/low
load vs. memorizing 6 numbers/high load). If the VSM hypoth-
esis is correct, then AB should decrease in both ABM conditions
regardless of the availability of attentional resources. In contrast,
if the ACM hypothesis is correct, then AB should be reduced in
the low cognitive load condition compared to the high cognitive
load condition.
Second, all the theoretical perspectives predict differences with
regard to the benefits of ABM. VSM predicts that leaving the VES
unaltered, early AB will still be observed, whereas ACM predicts
that initial attentional interference of threat can be reduced by
improving AC. Using ERP experiments that can shed light on
the time-course processing of AB, Eldar and Bar-Haim (2010)
found that ABM reduced P2 and P3 amplitudes and increased
N2 amplitude in response to the onset of threatening stimuli dur-
ing a dot-probe task. They interpreted these data as implying that
ABM involves late executive mechanisms rather than early ones.
In accordance with this hypothesis, Koster et al. (2010) found that
ABM influences late (1500ms) rather than early (30 or 100ms)
stages of threat processing. Again, despite these preliminary data,
this hypothesis is in need of experimental manipulations directly
investigating the implication of the VES in the maintenance
of AB.
FUTURE RESEARCH AVENUES
Through carefully considering how models of AB can inform
training approaches, two innovative lines of research appear
promising to advance ABM.
COMBINED MODIFICATION OF THREAT APPRAISAL AND ATTENTION
One interesting way to disentangle different models of attention
involvement in anxiety, as well as to potentially strengthen the
effects of ABM, could be to combine different training proce-
dures. According to VSM, reducing the sensitivity of the VES to
threatening stimuli should reduce AB, whereas ACM does not
make this prediction. To examine this hypothesis, future exper-
iments could simultaneously manipulate VES and AC. Previous
research has shown that both AC (e.g., Klingberg, 2010) and VES
(e.g., Clerkin and Teachman, 2010) are malleable. Regarding AC,
for instance, it has been shown that such control can be increased
over time using a repetitive training with cognitive training tasks
(Olesen et al., 2004). Based on previous studies, the VES may be
manipulated using a procedure based either on a classical eval-
uative conditioning paradigm, in which a threatening picture is
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paired with amore positive picture to reduce the evaluativemean-
ing of the threat picture (Clerkin and Teachman, 2010) or on
extinction paradigms in which a conditioned stimulus loses it
meaning in a novel context (Engelmann and Hein, 2013). It has
been found that such a procedure may alter functional connec-
tivity of the early visual processing regions (V1–V4) of threat
(Damaraju et al., 2009).
Nevertheless, as such, these expected observations cannot sus-
tain the conclusion that a change in AB can be unambiguously
attributed to a change in AC or VES processing resulting from
the training. As argued by MacLeod et al. (2009), this conclu-
sion requires that studies confirm predicted changes on a task
that reliably measures the mediating cognitive process. Moreover,
MacLeod et al. (2009) also argue that the magnitude in change in
the mediating process should predict the magnitude of improve-
ment on the outcome measures, which is AB in this case. To
address these requirements, changes in VES could be assessed
using an Affective Priming Task that allows for the indirect assess-
ment of the valence of stimuli by comparing its influence as
a prime on congruently or incongruently-valenced subsequent
stimuli. Changes in AC may be assessed using a general task
assessing the ability to inhibit a prepotent response (e.g., antisac-
cade task).
If the VEM hypothesis is correct, then reducing the impair-
ment in VES should lead to a decrease in AB. In contrast, if the
ACM hypothesis is right, then improving AC should reduce AB.
Finally, if both VES and AC are involved in AB, then the condi-
tions improving either VES or AC should reduce AB, as opposed
to control conditions that would present the same stimuli but that
do not affect VES nor AC.
COMBINING ATTENTIONAL BIAS MODIFICATION AND
NEUROMODULATION
According to the ACM, reducing AB should require DLPFC acti-
vation, whereas according to VEM it should not. Regarding the
empirical literature, it has been shown that inducing AB for
threat is related to altered activation of the DLPFC (Browning
et al., 2010). Moreover, a single session of High Frequency-
repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (HF-rTMS) on this
region impacts the magnitude of AB (e.g., Leyman et al., 2009;
De Raedt et al., 2010). Low-frequency rTMS (LF-rTMS) of ≤
1Hz temporally suppresses local neural activities, while high-
frequency rTMS (HF-rTMS) of ≥ 5Hz temporally activates local
neural activities (e.g., Pascual-Leone et al., 1998). As a conse-
quence, in order to more directly examine the hypothesis of
a need of DLPFC recruitment for reducing AB, future experi-
ments in the field may use LF-rTMS vs. HF-rTMS to temporarily
decrease vs. increase DLPFC (BA 9/46) activation before ABM.
If the VSM hypothesis is correct, then AB should be reduced
for both ABM conditions, regardless of the activation of the
DLPFC. In contrast, if the ACM hypothesis is correct, then AB
should only decrease for the ABM with DLPFC activation. More
recently, a series of papers using transcranial direct current stim-
ulation (tDCS) as a neuromodulation technique during cognitive
task has been published (e.g., Penolazzi et al., 2012). This tech-
nique applies a weak (0.5–2mA), direct electric current through
electrodes positioned over one’s scalp, which are able to reach
the neuronal tissue and induce polarization-shifts on the resting
membrane potential (Nitsche et al., 2008). Anodal stimulation
generally facilitates cortical activity, whereas cathodal tDCS has
opposite effects. The advantage of tDCS is that it allows to directly
modulate cortical activities during a task. With HF-rTMS it is
not possible to perform stimulation during the task, given that
the effects of stimulation only emerge after the procedure. Again,
future experiments in the field may use tDCS in order to directly
modulate the cortical excitability of the DLPFC (localized via F3
in the international 10–20 EEG system) during ABM.
CONCLUSIONS
Research has shown that training anxious individuals to attend
to non-threat stimuli reduces AB, which, in turn, reduces anx-
iety. This effect supports the hypothesis that AB can causally
influence the maintenance of anxiety. At a fundamental level,
however, uncertainty still abounds regarding the nature of this
process. Here, ABM seems only scarcely informed by key mod-
els of AB. We have argued that these models can provide critical
insights on how to understand the effects of ABM. Moreover,
ABM studies can be used to study the major proposals of
these models.
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